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Introduction
This article presents interview results which are part of a wider research
programme into the control bank managers have of their banks' return generating
resources (captured as core capabilities). In particular, changes in growth opportunities
within bank markets emerging from deregulation and IT innovations explored through
banks' geographic, product market, and customer group diversification strategies within
three competitive environments.
Research hypotheses were investigated through a total of 55, 1-hour,  semi-
structured interviews; with managers of commercial banks, investment banks,
management consulting firms and regulators from Mexico, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of this set of data suggested that domestic
competitors rather than foreign banks were perceived as the top driver for change of
industrial boundaries. IT management played a secondary role in the design of bank
strategy but at the same time, was perceived as an important force of change in bank
markets. The great majority of banks reckoned responding to these changes in their
growth opportunities through changes in their diversification moves and building upon a
platform-based view of core capabilities.
This article is divided in two parts. Part one, presents a framework to analyse the
relationship between core capabilities and diversification moves. Part two, relates this
framework to semi-structured interviews in three competitive environments.
Part 1:  A Framework to Assess Diversification Decisions
1.1   Internal and External Strategies
Commercial banks constitute  multi-product firms that can adopt organisational
profiles ranging from a narrow or focused to broad range (that is, universal or  gobal)
structures
i. Commercial banks adopt specific organisational features driven by strategic
considerations based on external and internal growth opportunities. External growth
opportunities are opened by regulatory change, technical innovation, developments in the
degree of market competition (market structure), and changes in customer preferences.
From an internal or production-function perspective, growth opportunities for
commercial banks depend on the ease with which operating efficiencies and scale and
scope economies can be exploited
ii.
A range of equally viable organisational profiles translates into different cost
structures for banks of the same size (and breadth of geographic, product market, and
customer group) because managerial skills capture different shares of growth
opportunities. "Better" or "superior" bank management skills are thus defined as the
ability to create and implement visionary strategies
iii.
Different cost structures emerging from "better" bank management suggest the
possibility that competitive advantage can be identified as access to a unique set of
resources, skills, and capabilities that effective managers make available to their banks.
In particular, whether managers develop new capabilities or enhance the current set of
capabilities to tap into opportunities opened by regulatory change and IT innovation. In
academic literature these patterns of firm behaviour are called related, semi-related, and
un-related diversification as firms respond to new growth opportunities by (respectively)2
not creating new capabilities, creating capabilities closely related to the no-change-state
set, or creating completely new capabilities
iv.
However, if before or after regulatory and technological change banks have
access to unique set of resources then greater contestability
v of bank markets would be an
overwhelming response of banks' geographic and customer group diversification rather
than product market diversification of new and potential entrants. As long as firms can
preserve and develop their stock of unique capabilities then actual or new competition
will be irrelevant to implement visionary strategies. In brief, managers' control of return-
generating resources provides key insights into how banks implement diversification
moves to tap into growth opportunities created by deregulation or IT innovation.
1.2  Management Styles and Growth Opportunities
Since variety in the organisational features of commercial banks supports many
alternative styles to bank strategy, it follows that there might be many alternatives to
achieve competitive edge by relating diversification moves, tangible or intangible
capabilities, and responses to entry threats
vi. However, grounded work by Michael Goold
and Andrew Campbell
vii is among those studies claiming that the potential response to
growth opportunities associates to a reduced number of organisational features. Variety is
reduced through management styles establishing, first, whether top executives regard as
important the contribution of middle managers to detect growth opportunities and second,
whether top executives consider that competitive advantage will emerge from integrating
activities round financial or strategic objectives.
Table 1 illustrates these strategic styles, their likely distribution, and their relation
with a particular form of control and performance objectives
viii. The first of these styles is
called “financial control” to encompass senior managers who believe better management
emerges from them setting tight expenditure objectives or strict performance targets and
thus, leaving most planning decisions to business unit managers. The second style is
called "strategic planning" to identify whether an authoritative CEO or a group of top
managers integrate business activities round strategic targets (such as market share) and
thus, cross-subsidies activities (that is, high-financial return businesses finance low-return
businesses while the latter achieve their strategic goals). The third style is called
“strategic control” and aims to represent senior managers who believe in active influence
and participation of business-unit managers to discover growth opportunities while
aiming to strike a balance between market performance and resource allocation within the
organisation.3
Table 1: Types of Strategic Management Styles and their Distribution, 1996
Type of Enforcement
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Strategic Planning
(Collegiated Approach)
Average   27.1%
(Mexico 42.9%)
(Spain    21.7%)
(UK       16.7%)
      Source: Goold and Campbell (1987), Goold et al. (1994), author.
      Sample: 55 managers in three countries, April to June 1996.
There are two elements in the criterion used by these management styles to assess
diversification moves. First, diversification must be expected to create value, either from
the new business to the parent company or vice versa. Secondly, through diversification
the parent organisation must be expected to add more value to the new business than any
other potential parent
ix. These two necessary conditions for competition suggest that
strategic styles reflect (rather than cause) competitive advantage and point towards
patterns of behaviour useful to identify treats of how strategy is formulated. Such features
are reflected in tendencies particular to each style
x:
•  "Strategic planning" companies favour organic growth (that is,  increase  core
capabilities);
•  "Financial control" firms would tend to favour diversification through acquisitions;
while
•  "Strategic control" companies would also favour growth through core capabilities but
balancing this growth with consolidation or divestiture of non-performing businesses
and as result, maintain without change the overall dimension of the firm.4
1.3  Relationship between Strategy, Diversification and Core Capabilities
Growth features associated with management styles have an implication on the
type of diversification move each style is likely to adopt as a response to external change.
Firstly, growth features of management styles suggest managers in "financial control"
firms will impose lower time-spans for diversification moves to achieve profitability or
higher rates of return to evaluate the present value of these diversification moves. This
profile for strategic investment criteria emerges from "financial control" firms perceiving
each diversification move as a "stand alone" business.
The specific response to deregulation and IT innovation of banks engaged under
"financial planning" style is likely to develop upon managers' perception of core
capabilities and whether they aim to pursue scale or scope economies. Geographic
concentration together with product-market and customer group diversification, seems
more likely for "financial planning" banks when capabilities are perceived as a broad
platform for growth. Patterns of scope diversification emerge as return-generating
resources associate with managers' ability to transfer proprietary information (intangible
capabilities such as " Knowhow") to alternative activities at lower costs than those
incurred by independent business units
xi. On the other hand, the degree of competition
does not seem to be a barrier to pursue growth through scale, that is, "financial control"
managers seem likely to complement geographic diversification with business line
consolidation to capture benefits associated with specific or unique capabilities.  See
further table 2.
Table 2: Likelihood of Diversification Move and Management Style
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Source: Author.
Banks managed under "strategic planning" styles seem likely to be less concern
with potential entrants (than those at "strategic control" banks) because of their slower
reaction to poor performing business
xii. That is, relatively bigger time spans assigned to
strategic investments and thus, for diversification moves to achieve profitability.  A
predisposition to universal and even global banking seems likelier for "strategic
planning" banks perceiving core capabilities as a broad platform for growth as they aim
to maximise cross-selling opportunities to the established customer base. On the other5
hand, for banks building upon unique capabilities achieving scale through product market
diversification seems more attractive.
Banks managed under "strategic control" styles seem likelier to assign lower time
spans for projects based on core or strategically important capabilities than to "stand
alone" capabilities. The pursuit of scale economies (based on a perception of capabilities
as a broad platform for growth) seems likely to be followed by customer group
diversification. As mentioned, scale economies associated with benefits of unique
resources and therefore, "strategic control" perceiving their capabilities as unique are
likely to focus on specific customer segments. Since "strategic control" managers do not
seem concerned with firm-size growth, the likeliest response to deregulation and IT
innovation seems to be pursuing scale or scope based on a narrow geographic span and
focus on product markets.
1.4  Relative Importance of Core Capabilities for Bank Growth
A trend emerging from interview results referred to whether financial
considerations were or were not dominant in strategy design. In 18% of cases managers
cited strategic criteria as the most important, 46% of results indicated financial
performance to be more important, and in 23% of the cases a combination of market
(strategic) and financial performance.
There were two main arguments used by participants to explain the emphasis on
strategic or financial control. Again, these arguments evolved round a perception of
unique-based or platform-based capabilities, that is, round a tolerance of an element of
cross-subsidisation which effectively inhibits adjustments. Some banks carry under-
performing services with the aim of securing or maintaining "global" relationships with
clients with the effect that under-performing activities could not be removed without
effectively removing the client portfolio. Managers, too, were prone to "market
commitment" (Senior Manager, 29-VI-96); that is, tolerance of deteriorating market
conditions to serve designated market segments or regions. The provision of universal
banking services often involved cross-subsidies in the absence of clear economies of
scale or scope. These goals aimed to secure profitability in "global" relationships (that is,
as a result of total services consumed by the client). Obviously, absence of reliable
costing of the service consumed could severely bias "global" profitability estimates.
Table 3 illustrates results that stem from interviewees' perception of the influence
of economic growth has over banks’ diversification strategies. In 63.0% of the responses
participants agreed that regulation limited their diversification strategies. However, in
64.0% of the cases core capabilities were more important than regulation to determine
bank expansion. Even more, the relative importance of core capabilities differed across
countries with Mexican interviewees emphasising economic growth and local regulation.
Spanish participants emphasised core capabilities and product maturity; while British
managers focused on core capabilities, and technical- and social developments. These
results  suggestes that Mexican interviewees were less likely to adopt long-term
(visionary) strategies than  their Spanish or British counterparts. In fact, competitive
advantage for Mexican banks seems likelier to arise from tactical strategies or random
change (that is, fortuitous association between positioning and environmental change).
This as few Mexican banks seemed willing (or able) to address tough decisions6
associated with the focused budget allocation needed to succeed in the pursuit of their
corporate vision (that is, long-term strategy).
Table 3: Relationship between Threat of Entry and Regulation, 1996
Mexico Spain UK Sample
Does regulation influence your
banks' diversification decisions?
Yes 84.6% 54.5% 58.3% 63.8%
No 15.4% 40.9% 41.7% 34.0%
Other 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 2.1%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100%




23.1% 13.6% 0.0% 12.0%
Core competencies 53.8% 54.5% 86.7% 64.0%
Other 23.1% 31.8% 13.3% 24.0%
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100%
    Source: Author.
In summary, this first part considers issues related to how greater contestability of
bank markets modifies perceptions on the relative importance of diversification moves
based on managers control of core capabilities within a framework developed by Michael
Goold and Andrew Campbell. The second part of the article proceeds comparing a
valuation of strategic investment decisions by alternative styles at bank management. The
distribution of results has clear implications towards the relative importance of core
capabilities to growth opportunities through diversification moves of universal, global,
and specialised banks. The discussion also uses the distribution of results on strategic
investments as building block to ascertain competitive threats in bank markets (that
emerge from established and potential participants that respond to regulatory change and
IT innovation).
(Note: References and footnotes appear at the end of part II).7
Part II:  Managers' Perception of Change
1.1  Characteristics of the Sample
  As mentioned before, this research evolved round banks’ approach to defining
boundaries to their activities with respect of geographic scope (global banking), business
lines (universal banking), and customer group. Because the research considered three
operating environments (that is, markets with unequal degrees of competition)
differences in regulatory and technological stages could be linked to diversification
decisions. Moreover, using countries in distinct markets provided an opportunity to see
common or shared responses and so disentangle phenomena affecting banking markets
generally from those affecting just one geography. In brief, the research explored the
strategic intent and actual outcome of planning processes under three regulatory systems.
Table 4 illustrates the distribution of  interviewees.
Table 4: Geographic and Sector Distribution of Participants in Survey, 1996
Country Mexico Spain U.K. Sum
Participants
Observers Incumbents
Banks 6 9 8 23
Cajas de Ahorro 0 4 0 4
Building Societies 0 0 3 3
Bank Analyst 4 6 3 13
Consultants 3 3 3 9
Regulators 1 1 1 3
14 23 18 55
The questionnaire built upon drafts of case studies and included six separate. open
ended, interviews (with bank CEOs, heads of planning, and academics). Interview topics
encompassed diversification decisions (that is, disposing or acquiring business lines);
elements to establish where and how the bank would compete;  evaluation of  market
performance; and the main future determinants of competition (identified as drivers of
strategic change). Diversification was broadly defined and aimed to reflect long-term
responses to change in the attractiveness of product markets, geographic setting, or
specific market segments (customer group).
The interview schedule was written in English and aimed to avoid technical terms
and intentionally invited participants to relate their conceptual explanations to
descriptions of tangible events from their own experiences. The survey schedule was
translated into Spanish using, as far as possible, equivalents to operational concerns. To
develop measures that were comparable across countries independent groups of British,
Spanish, and Latin American MBAs reviewed each version of the interview schedule. In
this way the schedule minimised the risk of having translation subtly changing the
significance, meaning, or overtones of the statements in different social settings.8
A problem highlighted by the exercise was the absence of a colloquial equivalent
in Spanish for “core capabilities”. The inherent ambiguity of the widely used concept
created problems even in English
xiii. Prior to the interview process telephone and email
enquiries of management consultants (4), business school academics in Spain (4) and
Mexico (2) were used to establish current practice. As a result, the interview schedule
used a different term for each geography (“capacidad  intrínseca” in Mexico and
“capacidades escenciales” in Spain). Moreover, a standardised definition supported each
of these terms in the form of a handout
xiv.
1.2  Initial Results
It was anticipated that either country of origin (i.e. competitive factors), type of
diversification move (i.e. growth opportunity pursued), strategic style (i.e. management
approach) or type of respondent (that is, distribution by sector) would result in a
statistically significant grouping of results. However, all estimates of the two-way
ANOVA (with replication) failed to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, that is, the
combination of great construct variety and sample size resulted in no-one single
dimension accruing for most of the variance in the results (not shown for brevity). This
was not the case for correlation emerging from the "country of origin" partition as its
values associated with the highest linear correlation coefficients (not shown for brevity).
A striking difference in strategic horizons was observed between countries and
amongst those reported by management consultants and banks. Results suggested that the
specific nature of projects assigned to management consultants limited their ability to
perceive strategic trends of individual institutions. This is further illustrated in table 5
(information is available from the authors on averaged discount rates used to evaluate
strategic investment projects).
Table 5: Strategic Planning Horizons, 1996
Country of Origin Type of Participant
Incumbents Observers
Mexico Spain UK Banks Analysts Consult





















































































For both "country of origin" and "type of participant" groupings, there was a
longer break-even for "stand alone" business than for "core" or "critical" business
suggesting, in turn, a faster payback for activities (presumably) associated with less
uncertainty as the latter are part of on-going endeavours. This result, however, raised an
interesting question. Since "critical" or "core" business are the main source of income,
faster paybacks suggested that rather than strategic, visionary, or long-term investments;
participants were providing information that scored tactical moves. In order words, most
participants seem to invest in already tested diversification moves rather than to explore
alternative venues (that is, creative or visionary projects that aim to redefine industry
boundaries).
Results suggested that either "core capabilities" was not a widely used concept,
the majority of banks implicitly pursued a platform approach to growth, or there was a
gap in the relationship between growth and core capabilities. These alternatives emerged
as unexpectedly, interview results consistently scored "critical" or "core" capabilities with
the same value as "stand alone" businesses (in terms of discount rates for capital
budgeting). Moreover, as some banks considered telephone banking a core capability
because it increased distribution and client capture opportunities and could be applied to
a range of business lines. Indeed, without this competence they would lose access to an
increasing part of their existing market. Others, however, consider it strategic
complement to current activities and set up new franchises (like Midland's First Direct in
the UK or Banco Santander's Open Bank in Spain). As a result, the analysis proceeded
assuming there was room for some manager to perceive capabilities as platform-based or
unique-based.
1.3  Investments in Return-Generating Resources
During the course of the interviews, investments in "core capability" aimed to
identify projects that were:
"...best managed on a co-ordinated, integrated basis, despite the additional
corporate costs this entails."
xv
Investment in core capabilities presumably identified a broad (platform)
perspective of capabilities as this type of investments increase in the markets served
because core capabilities are essential to the majority of products and the client base.
However, strategic  complementarity as a concept also encompasses co-ordination,
sharing skills, or optimising infrastructure; in a way that precludes independent
management and distinctive lines of responsibility.  Strategic complementarity aimed to
capture managers perceiving capabilities as unique or specific.
The fact that few participants were able to provide a distinctive view of their
drivers of profitability led to the segmentation of incumbents into four groups. In 40.0%
of the results suggested managers that followed a platform-based view of capabilities as
they were unable to identify core capabilities while pursuing diversification moves. This
was the biggest group of managers and where Mexican interviews scored the highest
percentage with 66.7% of that sub-sample. Results suggested the next biggest group were
managers unable to identify core capabilities while pursuing specialisation strategies
(with 30.0% of the results). Managers able to identify core capabilities and specialising10
were identified in 18.0% of the interviews and those able to identify and diversify
encompassed 12% of the interviewees. Table 6 summarises these dimensions.
Table 6: Relationship of Core Capabilities and Business Scope
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Source: Author.
The most common account amongst those managers able to identify core
capabilities (while pursuing diversification strategies) was their need to develop key
skills in IT related areas. In particular whether they could leverage the established
capability-base to tackle threats and opportunities of electronic commerce. Two
alternative strategies were described. Firstly, engaging in collaboration agreements with
IT and non-finance partners. Secondly, reorganise the current internal structure to
develop specialised bank, non-bank, and non-finance subsidiaries that centre on a limited
set of capabilities, and operate within an umbrella organisation.
Results emerging from the overall sample showed that managers ranked IT third
in importance (after greater income growth and risk control) to determine their
diversification moves. Specifically, improving the performance of distribution channels
had the same level of importance than enhancing core capabilities as a future concern for
market positioning.  Moreover, surveys of international financial institution (carried out
in 1993 and 1996), determined that as a force of change in financial markets
technological advances consistently ranked fourth in its importance to define the
boundaries of bank markets.
In brief, IT innovations and particularly, cross-border payment systems such as
those developed for electronic commerce could stimulate some banks to focus on their
core capabilities
xvi. However, this result is contingent to bank managers’ firm control of
the return generating resources (that is, their perception of unique or broad-based core
capabilities) and their perception of diversification strategies from non-bank and non-
finance intermediaries. These are competitive conditions that, succinctly, are seldom
explored in the literature on bank performance
xvii.11
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